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Abstract
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Epstein-Zin preferences have attracted signi￿cant attention within the macro-
￿nance literature based on DSGE models as they allow to substantially increase risk
aversion, and consequently generate non-trivial risk premia, without compromising
the ability of standard models to achieve satisfactory macroeconomic data coherence.
Such appealing features certainly hold for structural modelling frameworks where
monetary policy is set according to Taylor-type rules or seeks to minimize an ad hoc
loss function under commitment. However, Epstein-Zin preferences may have signif-
icant quantitative implications for both asset pricing and macroeconomic allocation
under a welfare-based monetary policy conduct. Against this background, the pa-
per focuses on the impact of such preferences on the Ramsey approach to monetary
policy within a medium-scale model based on Smets and Wouters (2007) including a
wide range of nominal and real frictions that have proven to be relevant for quanti-
tative business cycle analysis. After setting an empirical benchmark that generates
a mean value of 100 bp for the ten-year term premium, we show that Epstein-Zin
preferences signi￿cantly a⁄ect the macroeconomic outcome when optimal policy is
considered. The level and the dynamic pattern of risk premia are also markedly
altered. We show that the e⁄ect of Epstein-Zin preferences is extremely sensitive to
the presence of real rigidities in the form of quasi-kinked demands. We also analyse
how this e⁄ect can be linked to a combined e⁄ect of capital accumulation and wage
rigidities.5
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Non-Technical Summary
The paper examines the implications of Epstein-Zin preferences for both asset pricing
￿with a special focus on term premium￿and macroeconomic dynamics when monetary
policy maximizes the social welfare under commitment. The quantitative e⁄ects of
Epstein-Zin preferences are explored within a medium-scale model which embeds a wide
range of nominal and real frictions and has proven to be relevant for quantitative business
cycle analysis.
The original contributions of our paper cover several dimensions. First, we set an
empirical benchmark where we show how a fully speci￿ed model like Smets and Wouters
(2007) can be augmented with Epstein-Zin preferences so as to generate a ten-year term
premium of 100 bp on average. Compared with Rudebusch and Swanson (2009), we
consider a much richer baseline macro-model since we include several structural shocks,
endogenous capital accumulation with adjustment costs on investment and variable cap-
ital utilisation, wage rigidities and real frictions in the form of quasi-kinked demands.
In doing so, we follow up the approach of De Graeve et al. (2009a) who claim that
medium-scale DSGE models can describe bond yield dynamics in a satisfactory manner.
We also analyse how our calibration of the Epstein-Zin parameter crucially depends on
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the deterministic discount factor associ-
ated with the use of detrended variables. This helps us explain the wide dispersion of
values found in the empirical literature.
Second, our paper is linked to the literature analysing the optimal monetary policy
within DSGE models. Speci￿cally we focus on the link between Epstein-Zin preferences
and optimal policy. To our knowledge only Levin et al. (2008) attempt to assess the
in￿ uence of Epstein-Zin preferences on optimal macroeconomic allocations. They con-
sider a small stylised New Keynesian model with one shock and they explicitly show that
Epstein-Zin preferences enter the ￿rst-order approximation of the Ramsey policymaker￿ s
￿rst order conditions. In our medium-scale model, we rather rely on numerical simula-
tions that allow us to generalize their approach to a much larger and commonly used
model. Again, compared with Levin et al. (2008), we add many speci￿cations that have
proven to be empirically relevant. In line with the conclusions of Levin et al. (2008),
we provide numerical evidence that in general Epstein-Zin preferences strongly a⁄ect
the tradeo⁄s faced by the optimizing policymaker. Our analysis allows to highlight two
features. First, the e⁄ect of Epstein-Zin preferences is strongly a⁄ected by the presence
of quasi-kinked demands. Our paper is therefore related to the analysis of strategic com-6
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plementarities ￿quasi-kinked demands or ￿rm-speci￿c factors ￿and their implications
for monetary policy and welfare as conducted by Levin et al. (2007, 2008). Second, we
investigate the role of capital accumulation and nominal rigidities. We show that, in a
world with Dixit Stiglitz aggregators, with price rigidities only, the deviation from price
stability is ampli￿ed by Epstein-Zin preferences, be it with capital or not. Adding wage
rigidities tend to reduce this ampli￿cation.
Finally, unlike both the traditional macro-￿nance approach and the literature on
optimal policy, we analyse the behaviour of the term premium under optimal monetary
policy. We ￿nd that the e⁄ect of Epstein-Zin preferences on the level and the dynamics
of the term premium is much stronger under optimal policy and is qualitatively di⁄erent
from the Taylor rule case: the term premium is a non-linear function of the Epstein-Zin
parameter and we show how it is substantially shifted up in presence of quasi-kinked
demands.7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1209
June 2010
1 Introduction
The paper examines the implications of Epstein-Zin preferences for both asset pricing
and macroeconomic dynamics when monetary policy maximizes the social welfare under
commitment. The quantitative e⁄ects of Epstein-Zin preferences are explored within a
medium-scale model which embeds a wide range of nominal and real frictions and has
proven to be relevant for quantitative business cycle analysis.
Macro-￿nance literature aims at studying the interactions between the macroecon-
omy and the pricing of ￿nancial claims (yield curve, equity). A structural approach
consists in using Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models as a repre-
sentation of the macroeconomy and then deriving model-consistent non arbitrage con-
straints so as to price ￿nancial assets (see Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008, 2009, De
Graeve, Emiris and Wouters, 2009, Ravenna and Seppala, 2006, Doh, 2009, Amisano
and Tristani, 2010, to name but a few1). Over the last decade considerable progress has
been made regarding the speci￿cation and the empirical validation of structural macro-
economic models. For example models like Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
or Smets and Wouters (2007) have become workhorses for the macroeconomic analysis
due to their successful empirical properties. However, if the ability of such models to
match a satisfactory level of macroeconomic data coherence is now commonly admitted,
their weak performance on the ￿nancial side clearly calls for further improvement (see
Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008 for example and Tovar, 2008 for a survey). In a nutshell,
current generation of structural macroeconomic models generate risk premia that are too
small and too little volatile compared with non-structural measures2. As emphasized by
Cochrane (2007) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), asset pricing and macroeconomic
behaviours are inextricably linked so that unsatisfactory implications of standard DSGE
frameworks for the ￿nancial side may reveal crucial misspeci￿cations.
In order to cope with the need to obtain both macroeconomic and ￿nancial coherence,
recent papers by Andreasen (2009), Rudebusch and Swanson (2009), Guvenen (2009),
Amisano and Tristani (2010) ￿among others ￿have made use of non time-separable
preferences, namely Epstein Zin preferences, in the structural speci￿cation of agents￿
1We can divide the macro-￿nance literature into three categories. First, numerous papers deal with
a purely statistical approach which involves a non-structural representation of the macroeconomy asso-
ciated with an ad-hoc pricing-kernel (see Ang et al., 2006 for example). Second, some models are built
on a structural modelling of the economy but keep the speci￿cation of the pricing-kernel ad-hoc (see
H￿rdhal et al. 2007). Third, as reported in the main text, several papers analyse the implications of
fully structural models consisting of a structural macro part and its consistent pricing-kernel. In this
paper we are interested in the latter approach.
2See Rudebusch, Sack and Swanson (2007) for a survey.8
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2 The DSGE model
Here we summarize the baseline model considered all along the paper and we pose the
Ramsey optimization problem with Epstein-Zin preferences. We point out the impact
of such preferences on the equilibrium conditions as well as the optimal policy. Our
model is a slightly modi￿ed version of Smets and Wouters (2007) and De Graeve et
al. (2009a) in which we consider Epstein-Zin preferences. The Smets and Wouters
(2007) model is here considered as a benchmark and its microfoundations are therefore
not discussed. We assume staggered nominal wage and price contracts ￿ la Calvo (1983)
with partial indexation, adjustment costs on investment and capacity utilization, internal
habit persistence. We also include real rigidities by using a Kimball (1995) agregator
for both goods and labour markets, which results in quasi-kinked demand functions (see
Levin et al. 2007).
2.1 Summary ot the theoretical model
2.1.1 Households behaviour
The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogenous in￿nitely-lived households.
Each household is characterized by the quality of its labour services, h 2 [0;1]. At time



















Household h obtains utility from consumption of an aggregate index Ct(h); relative to
an internal habit depending on its past consumption, while receiving disutility from
the supply of their homogenous labor Lh
t . ~ L is a positive scale parameter. Utility also
incorporates a consumption preference shock "b
t as well as a labour supply shock "l
t.
Following Epstein and Zin (1989) and adopting the formulation of Rudebusch and
Swanson (2009) and Andreasen (2009), we introduce Epstein-Zin preferences by assum-
ing that the welfare follows the dynamic:




The parameter ￿ is the deterministic discount factor and ￿EZ denotes the Epstein-
Zin parameter. As shown by Swanson (2010), when Wt(h) is positive, the higher ￿EZ,
the more risk-adverse the agent, and conversely when Wt(h) is negative.12
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Each household h maximizes its welfare W0(h) under the Epstein-Zin constraint (2)
and the following budget constraint:
Bt(h)
PtRt






t + At(h) + Tt(h)
Pt
+ rk
t ut(h)Kt￿1(h) ￿ ￿(ut(h))Kt￿1(h) + ￿t(h)
(3)
where Pt is an aggregate price index, Rt = 1 + it is the one period ahead nominal
interest factor, Bt(h) is a nominal bond, It(h) is the investment level Wh
t is the nominal
wage, Tt(h) and ￿w;t are government transfers and time-varying labor tax, and
rk
t ut(h)Kt￿1(h) ￿ ￿(ut(h))Kt￿1(h) (4)
represents the return on the real capital stock minus the cost associated with variations
in the degree of capital utilization. The income from renting out capital services depends
on the level of capital augmented for its utilization rate. The cost (or bene￿t) ￿ is an
increasing function of capacity utilization and is zero at steady state, ￿(u?) = 0. ￿t(h)
are the dividend emanating from monopolistically competitive intermediate ￿rms. Fi-
nally At(h) is a stream of income coming from state contingent securities and equating
marginal utility of consumption across households h 2 [0;1].
In choosing the capital stock, investment and the capacity utilization rate the house-
holds take into account the following capital accumulation equation:









where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate, S is a non negative adjustment cost function
such that S (￿) = 0 and "I
t is an e¢ ciency shock on the technology of capital accumula-
tion.
In equilibrium, households choices in terms of consumption, hours, bond holdings, in-
vestment and capacity utilization are identical (see Smets and Wouters, 2007, Adjemian
et al., 2008). Therefore, the welfare is also identical accross households, and the ￿rst
order conditions are reported in Appendix A.1, dropping the h index.
The functional forms used for the adjustment costs on capacity utilization and in-
vestment are given by ￿(X) = rk?
’ (exp[’(X ￿ 1)] ￿ 1) and S (x) = ￿=2 (x ￿ ￿)
2.
2.1.2 Labour supply and wage setting
Intermediate goods producers make use of a labour input LD
t produced by a segment
of labour packers. Those labour packers operate in a competitive environment and13
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aggregate a continuum of di⁄erentiated labour services Lt(i); i 2 [0;1] using a Kimball










di = 1 (6)









(￿w(1 +  w) ￿ 1)
￿














This function, where the parameter  w determines the curvature of the demand curve,
reduces to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator under the restriction  w = 0.
The di⁄erentiated labour services are produced by a continuum of unions which
transform the homogeneous household labor supply. Each union is a monopoly supplier
of a di⁄erentiated labour service and sets its wage on a staggered basis, paying house-
holds the nominal wage rate Wh
t . Every period, any union faces a constant probability
1 ￿ ￿w of optimally adjusting its nominal wage, say W￿
t (i), which will be the same for
all suppliers of di⁄erentiated labor services. We denote thereafter wt the aggregate real
wage that intermediate producers pay for the labor input provided by the labor packers
and w￿
t the real wage claimed by re-optimizing unions.
When they cannot re-optimize, wages are indexed on past in￿ ation and steady state
in￿ ation according to the following indexation rule:
Wt(i) = ￿ [￿t￿1]
￿w [￿?]
1￿￿w Wt￿1(i) (8)
with ￿t = Pt
Pt￿1 the gross rate of in￿ ation. Taking into account that they might not
be able to choose their nominal wage optimally in a near future, W￿
t (i) is chosen to
maximize their intertemporal pro￿t under the labor demand from labor packers. Unions
are subject to a time-varying tax rate ￿w;t which is a⁄ected by a shock de￿ned by
1￿￿w;t = (1 ￿ ￿?
w)"w
t . The corresponding ￿rst order conditions are reported in Appendix
A.2.
2.1.3 Producers behaviour
Final producers are perfectly competitive ￿rms producing an aggregate ￿nal good Yt
that may be used for consumption and investment. This production is obtained using a14
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continuum of di⁄erentiated intermediate goods Yt(z); z 2 [0;1] with the Kimball (1995)


















(￿p(1 +  ) ￿ 1)
￿














The representative ￿nal good producer maximizes pro￿ts PtYt￿
R 1
0 Pt(z)Yt(z)dz sub-
ject to the production function, taking as given the ￿nal good price Pt and the prices of
all intermediate goods.
In the intermediate goods sector, ￿rms z 2 [0;1] are monopolistic competitors and








t is an exogenous productivity shock, ￿ > 0 is a ￿xed cost and ￿ is the trend
technological growth rate. A ￿rm z hires its capital, e Kt(z) = utKt￿1(z), and labor,
LD
t (z), on a competitive market by minimizing its production cost. Due to our assump-
tions on the labor market and the rental rate of capital, the real marginal cost is identical
across producers. We introduce a time varying tax on ￿rm￿ s revenue is a⁄ected by a








In each period, a ￿rm z faces a constant (across time and ￿rms) probability 1 ￿ ￿p
of being able to re-optimize its nominal price, say P￿
t (z). If a ￿rm cannot re-optimize its




the nominal price is indexed on past in￿ ation and steady state in￿ ation. In our model,
all ￿rms that can re-optimize their price at time t choose the same level, denoted p￿
t in
real terms. The corresponding ￿rst order conditions are reported in Appendix A.3.
2.1.4 Government
Public expenditures G? are subject to random shocks "
g
t. The government ￿nances
public spending with labour tax, product tax and lump-sum transfers:
PtG?￿t"
g
t ￿ ￿w;tWtLt ￿ ￿p;tPtYt ￿ PtTt = 0 (12)15
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2.1.5 Market clearing conditions
Market clearing condition on goods market is given by:
Yt = Ct + It + G?"
g








with ￿pk;t is a price dispersion index whose dynamics is presented in the appendix A.3.
Equilibrium in the labour market implies that
￿wk;tLD





t (z)dz and Lt =
R 1
0 Lh
t dh: The dynamics of the wage dispersion index
￿wk;t is also described in the appendix A.2.
2.1.6 Competitive equilibrium conditions
Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) provide details of the derivation of the equilibrium
conditions with Epstein-Zin preferences. The same methodology is employed here and
the ￿rst order conditions are reported in Appendix. Epstein-Zin preferences introduce
a convexity term in the recursive equation of the household ￿ s welfare. This in turn















where ￿t is the marginal utility of consumption5. The standard case ￿ hereafter
referred to as expected utility case ￿corresponds to ￿EZ = 0.
Regarding the macroeconomic block the pricing-kernel is used to determine the op-
timal price and wage as well as the capital and investment dynamic. Up to a ￿rst order
approximation the equilibrium conditions are strictly equivalent to the expected utility
case. Therefore, as a theoretical matter, a log-linearized macroeconomic model with a
monetary authority acting according to a standard Taylor rule yields the same results,
whether Epstein-Zin preferences are used or not. This is what Levin et al. (2008) call
macroeconometric equivalence.
5The marginal utility of consumption is also a⁄ected by the Epstein-Zin preferences due to the
presence of internal habits (see equation 20 in Appendix).16
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2.1.7 Taylor rule
In what follows, the case of a central bank following a Taylor rule shall constitute
a benchmark for our analysis. In that case, the nominal interest rate is adjusted in



















where R￿ is the steady state nominal (gross) rate and Y ￿
t the natural output, ie, the
￿ exible price output. The parameter ￿ re￿ ects the degree of interest rate smoothing.
2.1.8 Ramsey policy
As detailed by Levin and al. (2008) we de￿ne the Ramsey policy as the monetary pol-
icy under commitment which maximizes the household￿ s aggregate welfare W0, subject
to the competitive equilibrium conditions and the Epstein-Zin constraint (2), given the









t values of the state variables dated
t < 0, and values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints dated t < 0.
The Ramsey programme involves a Lagrangian multiplier ￿t associated with the











where Tt is a term whose conditional expectation at time t is zero. As explicitly
shown by Levin et al. (2008) in a smaller model, the ￿rst-order approximation of this
equation still involves the Epstein-Zin parameter ￿EZ. Therefore, ex ante, Epstein-Zin
preferences enter the ￿rst-order approximation of the optimal policy and may alter the
optimal macroeconomic allocation, re￿ ecting the so-called microeconomic dissonance.
2.2 Calibration
Structural parameters of the macro-model
The parameter values that we use for our economic structure ￿ apart from the
Epstein-Zin parameter ￿are reported in table 1 and are relatively standard in the liter-
ature.
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), we set r￿ = 100(1=￿ ￿ 1) to 0:16. The model
is detrended with a derministic trend (￿) set to 0:43. The inverse of the households ￿17
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variance decomposition of Smets and Wouters (2007)7.
2.3 The term premium
The term premium on a nominal bond yield with a certain maturity is de￿ned
as the di⁄erence between the actual yield and the corresponding yield which would
prevail in a risk-neutral world (see Rudebusch, Sack and Swanson, 2007, Rudebusch
and Swanson, 2008-2009). To compute the term premium in our model we follow the
approach of Rudebusch and Swanson (2008, 2009) and De Graeve et al. (2009) by
assuming the existence of an in￿nite-lived consol paying o⁄ geometric coupons. We
calibrate the coupon so that the duration is 10 years and we use the corresponding yield
as an approximation for the 10 year zero coupon yield. At time t, in our DSGE model,
the term premium measures the compensation required by the agents who consider as
risky the fact that future shocks may lead the short rate to deviate from the expected
path. The term premium is therefore intrinsically linked with agents￿risk aversion.
Swanson (2010) provides clari￿cations regarding the link between the term premium
implied by DSGE models and risk aversion. He proves that any premium can be written,
to second order approximation around the non-stochastic steady state, as:
tpt = A(￿EZ) ￿ covt (dAt+1;dpt+1) + B ￿ covt (d￿t+1;dpt+1) (17)
where A(￿EZ) is the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient re￿ ecting the risk aversion8, dpt+1 is the
￿rst order dynamic of the asset price ￿here the 10 year bond price ￿ , dAt+1 denotes the
change in households ￿wealth and d￿t+1 the change in current and future wages and
interest rates9. The coe¢ cient A(￿EZ) is a linear function of ￿EZ whose coe¢ cients
depend on the steady state. In particular, equation (17) shows that the stochastic
steady state of the term premium depends only on the ￿rst order approximation of the
macroeconomic dynamics.
7The impulse response functions for macroeconomic variables we shall present use the ￿rst order
approximation of the model and are therefore proportional to the size of the shocks. Likewise, there
exists a similar proportional relationship with the unconditional mean of the term premium as well as
its third order dynamic.
8Here the term risk aversion refers to the concept properly de￿ned by Swanson (2010) taking account
of both consumption and labour margins.
9This is the formula (39) using the equation (A15) in Swanson (2010).19
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3 What calibration for the Epstein-Zin parameter?
A few studies have so far attempted to estimate or calibrate the Epstein-Zin parame-
ter in DSGE models and there seems to be no consensus on a "reasonable" interval the
values of ￿EZ would have to lie in. On the one hand, using grid search, Rudebusch and
Swanson (2009) estimate values of ￿EZ lying between 75 and 88 in a small DSGE model
with three shocks. These values are of similar magnitude to those found by Binsbergen
et al. (2008)10 and Campanale et al. (2009). Amisano and Tristani (2010) ￿nd a much
smaller value ￿about 8 with our speci￿cation￿but their empirical approach is slightly
di⁄erent as they rely on stochastic volatility. On the other hand, using Quasi-Maximum
Likelihood techniques in a larger model11, Andreasen (2009) obtains a value of 1981.
Therefore, the value of ￿EZ needed to match a certain level of term premium seems to
crucially depend on the sophistication and the size of the underlying macro-model. We
shall argue that this is actually not the case.
In the spirit of Rudebusch and Swanson (2009), given the calibration of the macro-
model presented in subsection 2.2, we ￿rst choose a value of ￿EZ that generates a
ten-year term premium equal to 100 bp on average. The average of the term premium
￿or stochastic steady state ￿is calculated using a second order approximation to our
macro-model12. We obtain:
￿EZ = 930
Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions of the term premium to four selected
structural shocks: technology, preferences, labour supply and price markup13. With
Epstein-Zin preferences the reactions are ampli￿ed and more persistent. The term pre-
mium reacts negatively to positive technology, labour supply and price markup shocks,
and positively to a preference shock, which represents a shock on the pricing kernel.
However, if the e⁄ect is very marked, the responses of the premium, expressed in basis
points, remain small. Accordingly, the volatility of the term premium amounts to 1:6
bp in our baseline calibration, which is well under the volatility targeted by Rudebusch
10See their comparison with the literature.
11The model estimated by Andreasen (2009) is closer to ours than that of Rudebusch and Swanson
(2009), although it does not include wage rigidities and quasi-kinked demands.
12Computing DSGE models using perturbation methods has been shown to deliver a very high degree
of accuracy (see Caldara et al., 2009). We therefore rely on this method to solve our model to the second
￿and third order ￿approximation.
13The impulse response functions of the term premium are obtained using a third order approximation
to the model.20
ECB




 *:7E7 D7EG>FE D793D6;@9 F:7 E?3>> HA>3F;>;FK A8 F:7 F7D? BD7?;G?
;?B>;76 4K ) ?A67>E 7H7@ 3G9?7@F76 I;F: BEF7;@/;@ BD787D7@57E 3D7 ;@ >;@7 I;F:
F:7 7?B;D;53> M@6;@9E A8 @6D73E7@ 


E AGD H3>G7 A8  ;E 34AGF F7@ F;?7E 3E :;9: 3E F:7 A@7 8AG@6 4K (G674GE5:
3@6 )I3@EA@ 

 I7 @AI 7J3?;@7 I:;5: 8D;5F;A@E 3@6 B3D3?7F7DE ?3K 7JB>3;@
F:;E 6;R7D7@57 A8 H3>G7 47FI77@ 3 E?3>> ?A67> 3@6 3 ?76;G?E53>7 ?A67> >;=7 AGDE AD
@6D73E7@ 

 AD 6;R7D7@F EG4?A67>E 3@6 53>;4D3F;A@E I7 67F7D?;@7 I:;5: H3>G7 A8
 ;E @77676 ;@ AD67D FA ?3F5: 3 

 4B F7@K73D F7D? BD7?;G? *:7 3EEG?BF;A@E I7
8A5GE A@ B7DF3;@ FA 7@6A97@AGE 53B;F3> 355G?G>3F;A@ :34;F 8AD?3F;A@ 3@6 I397 D;9;6;F;7E
I:;5: 3D7 F:7 ?3;@ 6;R7D7@57E I;F: (G674GE5: 3@6 )I3@EA@ 

 7 D 7; F; EI A D F :
@AF;@9 F:3F ;@ 3 *3K>AD DG>7 47@5:?3D= F:7 >7H7> A8 F:7 F7D? BD7?;G? 6A7E @AF 67B7@6
A@ D73> D;9;6;F;7E ;@ 3 8AD? A8 CG3E;=;@=76 67?3@6E A@57 F:7 +2".(( 679D77 A8 D;9;6;FK ;7
F:7 E>AB7 A8 F:7 &:;>>;BE 5GDH7E ;E MJ76 @6776 ;@ F:3F 53E7 F:7 MDEF AD67D 6K@3?;5E
;E ;@67B7@67@F A8 F:7 679D77 A8 D73> D;9;6;F;7E 3@6 EA FAA ;E F:7 >7H7> A8 F:7 BD7?;G?
E77 7CG3F;A@  -7 3>EA 8A5GE A@ F:D77 B3D3?7F7DE F:3F :3H7 3 E;9@;M53@F ;?B35F
A@ F:7 F7D? BD7?;G? 3@6 ?AD7 97@7D3>>K A@ D;E= 3H7DE;A@ F:7 67F7D?;@;EF;56 ; E 5 A G @ F
835FAD  F:7 FD7@6  3@6 F:7 ;@H7DE7 A8 ;@F7DF7?BAD3> 7>3EF;5;FK A8 EG4E;FGF;A@ 
*:7E7 B3D3?7F7DE 6;D75F>K 7@F7D F:7 BD;5;@9 =7D@7>  3@6 3D7 F:7D78AD7 ;?BADF3@F
67F7D?;@3@FE A8 F:7 D;E= BD7?;3 -7 5A@E;67D FIA 53>;4D3F;A@E F:7 MDEF A@7P 
 
 
3@6  P5ADD7EBA@6E FA F:3F A8 (G674GE5: 3@6 )I3@EA@ 

 3@6 F:7
E75A@6 A@7 P     	
   
  3@6    P FA F:3F A8 )?7FE 3@6
-AGF7DE 

 *:7 AF:7D B3D3?7F7DE 3D7 >78F G@5:3@976 E77 *34>7 
*34>7  D7BADFE F:7 D7EG>FE A8 AGD E;?G>3F;A@E *:;E F34>7 53>>E 8AD E7H7D3> 5A??7@FE
;DEF F:7 ;?BADF3@F 6;R7D7@57 A8 F:7 H3>G7 @77676 8AD  ;@ 3 ?A67> 5>AE7 FA (G674GE5:
3@6 )I3@EA@ 

 3@6 ;@ 3 ?A67> >;=7 AGDE 6A7E *+0 5A?7 8DA? F:7 366;F;A@ A8 EB75;
M53F;A@E >;=7 7@6A97@AGE 53B;F3> 355G?G>3F;A@ AD I397 D;9;6;F;7E @6776 9;H7@ 3 H3>G7
A8 2 ;F ;E BAEE;4>7 FA 97@7D3F7 3 EG4EF3@F;3> F7D? BD7?;G? 8AD 3@K EG4?A67>
I;F: DAG9:>K F:7 E3?7 H3>G7 A8  >F:AG9: I7 A4E7DH7 F:3F 53B;F3> 355G?G>3F;A@
F7@6E FA ;@5D73E7 F7D? BD7?;3 ;F 6A7E @AF 8G>>K 7JB>3;@ F:7 6;R7D7@57 A8 53>;4D3F;A@ @
835F F:7 ?3;@ 5:3@97 D7EG>FE 8DA? ?A6;M53F;A@E A8   AD   @; @ 5 D 7 3 E 7; @A @ 7A 8
(G674GE5: 3@6 )I3@EA@ 

 3;? 3F 97@7D3F;@9 3 HA>3F;>;FK A8  4B 8AD F:7 F7D? BD7?;G? *:7;D
53>;4D3F;A@ 97@7D3F7E 3 HA>3F;>;FK A8  4B
%GD H3>G7 ;E :AI7H7D I7>> >AI7D F:3@ F:3F 7EF;?3F76 4K @6D73E7@ 


A?B3D76 I;F: (G674GE5: 3@6 )I3@EA@ 

 I7 3>EA 366 F:D77 E:A5=E BD787D7@57E >34AGD EGBB>K
3@6 BD;57 ?3D=GB
*:7D78AD7 CG3E;=;@=76 67?3@6E 6A @AF 7JB>3;@ F:7 6;R7D7@57 A8 53>;4D3F;A@21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1209
June 2010
￿c = 1:37 ￿c = 2:
(￿;￿) = (:99,0) (￿SW,:43) (:99,0) (￿SW,:43)
no capital no hab. 407 1130 114 180
no wage rig. hab. 398 1110 111 177
capital no hab. 360 970 112 170
no wage rig. hab. 343 930 106 163
capital no hab. 360 960 112 168
wage rig. hab. 348 930 108 165
Table 2: Value of the Epstein-Zin parameter needed to match a level of 100 bp for the
ten-year term premium
these parameters ampli￿es the dependence of risk aversion on ￿EZ. As a consequence,
the value ￿EZ = 88 used by Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) results from their speci￿c
calibration of ￿c, ￿ and ￿. In other words, with smaller calibrations of ￿c and the use
of detrended variables, like in Smets and Wouters (2007) risk premia are much lower
(up to 10 times). Second, the introduction of internal habits tends to slightly decrease
the value of ￿EZ needed in our exercise. This con￿rms that the introduction of habit
formations is not enough to generate substantial risk premia although they do have a
small and positive impact (see Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008).
4 Optimal policy with Epstein-Zin preferences
In this section we show how Epstein-Zin preferences alter the optimal macroeco-
nomic allocations and the implied term premium by comparing our empirical benchmark
(￿EZ = 930) to the expected utility case (￿EZ = 0) . In this respect, we focus on four
structural shocks: technology, preference, labour supply and price markup.
4.1 Optimal macroeconomic allocations
In section 2.1.8 we have shown, like Levin et al. (2008), that the Epstein-Zin para-
meter directly enters the ￿rst-order approximation of the optimal policy, regardless of
the set of frictions or the presence of subsidies. However, this does not guarantee that
Epstein-Zin preferences will e⁄ectively a⁄ect the macroeconomic allocation. For exam-
ple, it is worth noting that the presence of subsidies aimed at o⁄setting the distortion
in the steady state due to monopolistic competition in the goods and labour markets
cancels the ￿rst-order Epstein-Zin e⁄ects. This result should not be too surprising. In22
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macroeconomic aggregates. Those correlations play an important role for risk premia,
as will be shown in the next section. Once again, when the steady-state is distorted,
Epstein-Zin preferences strongly modify the structure of the correlation matrix. Tables
7 to 10 show how the correlation matrices are twisted when ￿EZ increases. Considering
the technology shock (table 7), we distinguish between three types of reactions. First,
some correlations are markedly ampli￿ed. This is the case of all the correlations involving
labour and the correlations between in￿ ation and output gap, and between interest rate
and real wage, output, consumption and investment. Second, some others are completly
reversed. This is the case of the correlations between in￿ ation and real wage, output,
consumption and investment, as well as those between output gap and real wage, interest
rate, output, consumption and investment. Finally, the remaining correlations are left
broadly unchanged. Roughly similar features ￿some correlations are ampli￿ed, others
are reversed or left unchanged￿hold for the three other shocks. These features highlight
the non-linear e⁄ect of Epstein-Zin preferences on optimal allocations.
4.2 Application to the term premium
Since Epstein-Zin preferences have been introduced to improve on the general equi-
librium pricing of ￿nancial assets, we provide here some insights into the term premium
implied by our model as a function of the Epstein-Zin parameter. Equation (17) allows
to analyse the behaviour of the term premium by distinguishing between two e⁄ects.
First, Epstein-Zin preferences induce a linear increase in the risk aversion through the
Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient. Thus, given a ￿rst order macroeconomic dynamic, the term pre-
mium linearily increases with the Epstein-Zin sensitivity with a slope depending on the
steady state of the economy. In a Taylor-rule-based benchmark or under optimal policy
with an e¢ cient steady state, the macroeconomic outcome and hence the covariances in
(17) are not impacted by Epstein-Zin preferences (up to a ￿rst order approximation).
Therefore, in that case, as underlined by Swanson (2010), the level of the term premium
is a linear function of ￿EZ. This quantitative e⁄ect on the risk premium is mechanical.
Second, as noted in section 4.1, the optimal policy in general depends on Epstein-Zin
preferences. Thus, taking into account such preferences leads to modi￿cations of the
macroeconomic allocation. In particular, as the ￿rst order dynamic of a bond price is
completely determined by the ￿rst order expected path of the short rate, the covariances
in equation (17) are a⁄ected by ￿EZ, which in turn induces a qualitative e⁄ect on the
term premium. The overall e⁄ect on risk premia may therefore be non-linear.29
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5 What drives the Epstein-Zin e⁄ects in the optimal allo-
cation?
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main purpose of this paper is to analyse
Epstein-Zin preferences within an operational and commonly used, medium-scale DSGE
model. In this section we wish to know the extent to which the results presented in
the previous section rely on the numerous underlying assumptions. Given the high
number of parameters and assumptions, we highlight two e⁄ects which appear to be
the most relevant for the understanding of the way Epstein-Zin preferences operate: the
dependence of optimal policy on the presence of real rigidities via quasi-kinked demands
and the combined e⁄ect of capital accumulation and wage rigidities.
5.1 The role of quasi-kinked demands
Here we examine the in￿ uence of real rigidities and Kimball aggregators on optimal
monetary policy with or without Epstein-Zin preferences. As emphasized by Levin et
al. (2008), once the overall degree of rigidity ￿i.e. the slope of the Phillips curves for
prices and wages in￿ ation ￿is ￿xed, the combination of nominal and real rigidities (the
choice of  i, ￿i) does not matter for the ￿rst order approximation to the equilibrium
conditions, i.e., yields the same ￿rst order dynamic for price and wage in￿ ation. In
addition, as shown in section 3, in a Taylor rule benchmark, the implied term premium
does not depend on the presence of such real rigidities. However, we know that the
introduction of Kimball aggregators ( i > 0) have markedly di⁄erent implications when
optimal policy is considered (see Levin et al., 2008). We contribute to this literature by
investigating how the welfare is a⁄ected by real rigidities when the agents have Epstein-
Zin preferences. In the previous section, we have considered the case of a complete
model including Kimball aggregators. We now examine the optimal policy in the case
of standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators ( i = 0), setting the degrees of nominal rigidity
so that the overall degree of real rigidity remains unchanged.
First, our numerical simulations suggest that the strong sensitivity of the volatility
of optimal policy with respect to Epstein-Zin preferences is mainly due to Kimball ag-
gregators. In a model with standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators, Epstein-Zin preferences
still have an impact on the macroeconomic outcome, but, for a given combination of
parameters, its magnitude is less important as can be seen in table 5: the volatility of
the macroeconomic aggregates are not substantially a⁄ected by Epstein-Zin preferences
(compared with table 3). Second, for the same value of ￿EZ (here 930), ￿gures 7 to 1032
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Steady State Aggregators ￿EZ = 0 ￿EZ = 930
E¢ cient Qs. Kinked 29 282
Dixit Stiglitz 27 264
Distorted Qs. Kinked 34 381
Dixit Stiglitz 28 273
Table 6: In￿ uence of quasi-kinked demands on term premium (mean, in bp)
5.2 Capital, wage rigidities and the Epstein-Zin mechanics
In this subsection we detail how Epstein-Zin preferences operate under optimal
policy within our medium-scale model. In this respect we perform a sensitivity analysis
by focusing on capital, price and wage rigitities. Here we consider only Dixit Stiglitz
aggregators in order to make our results comparable with those of Levin et al. (2008).
Since many papers dealing with optimal policy in a New Keynesian framework do not
allow for capital accumulation ￿Benigno and Woodford (2005), Levin et al. (2008),
for example ￿the ￿rst restriction we impose pertains to capital. Starting from the full
model, we ￿nd that dropping capital accumulation leads to qualitative di⁄erences in
the reactions to shocks. As shown in ￿gures 11 and 12, regarding the technology and
labour supply shocks, the sign of the shift due to Epstein-Zin preferences depends on
the presence of capital. However, this phenomenon does not happen for preference and
price markup shocks.
We now argue that this di⁄erence results from the fact that, with Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregators, Epstein-Zin preferences amplify the policy tradeo⁄ due to price rigidities
while this ampli￿cation tends to be weakened by wage rigidities. To see this, we conduct
an analysis of the Epstein-Zin impact using submodels. For brevety, we focus on the
response of in￿ ation to a positive technology shock, but a similar analysis would also
apply to other shocks and variables. We naturally study the case of a distorted steady
state. Let us ￿rst consider a submodel including only price rigidities24. In the expected
utility world, the policymaker faces a tradeo⁄and cannot stabilize in￿ ation and welfare-
relevant output gap. Following a positive technology shock, in￿ ation reacts negatively
under optimal policy. With Epstein-Zin preferences, this impact is ampli￿ed as shown in
chart 13 (left side). Now, adding endogenous capital accumulation leads to the opposite
reaction. Even in the expected utility world, in￿ ation positively react to the same
technology shock. This is fully in line with the results obtained by Faia (2008). In
24From the full model, we drop capital accumulation, wages rigidities and subsidies.34
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this case again, we note that Epstein-Zin preferences tend to amplify the reactions (see
chart 13, right side). We note that the degree of price rigidities does not signi￿cantly
a⁄ect the Epstein-Zin impact. Finally, progressively allowing for wage rigidities ￿and
therefore returning to the full model with Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators ￿we observe i) a
downward shift of the response of in￿ ation in both expected utility and Epstein-Zin
cases, along with ii) a gradual decrease in the Epstein-Zin e⁄ect. This decrease also
occurs in absence of capital. This can be seen in chart 14. This shows that price and
nominal wage rigidities do not have the same impact on the policymaker￿ s tradeo⁄. As
a conclusion, we have shown that, in presence of Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators, with price
rigidities only, the optimal reaction is ampli￿ed, be it with capital or not. Adding wage
rigidities tend to reduce this ampli￿cation25.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, through the use of Epstein-Zin preferences in a Smets and Wouters
(2007) framework, we provide an empirical benchmark in which we are able to generate a
ten-year term premium of 100 bp on average. We show that the calibration of ￿EZ needed
to match such a level mainly depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the deterministic discount factor associated with the use of detrended variables.
As a theoretical matter, Epstein-Zin preferences as well as real rigidities in the form
of quasi-kinked demands do not have any impact on the ￿rst order dynamic of the
macro-model and the implied term premium, on average, is linear as a function of the
Epstein-Zin parameter. Against this background, we perform numerical simulations in
order to analyse the optimal monetary policy implied by such a benchmark and how
Epstein-Zin preferences distort the optimal allocation. Our results highlight several
e⁄ects. First, within medium-scale DSGE frameworks, Epstein-Zin preferences do have
a signi￿cant impact on the ￿rst order dynamics of optimal policy ￿especially in￿ ation,
output gap and real wage. Second, our simulations show that this e⁄ect strongly depends
on the presence of quasi-kinked demands which, in our benchmark, alter the sign of
the Epstein-Zin e⁄ects and the volatility. Third, our numerical approach allows us to
span many submodels relatively easily: expliciting the ￿rst order approximation of the
Ramsey problem by hand would be impossible in the full model and very cumbersome
in small submodels. In addition, in any case, such an approach would not deliver more
25As a check of robustness, we have veri￿ed that the results presented in section 5.2 are valid for any
value of ￿EZ lying between 0 and 930.35
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t = ￿0 (ut) (23)
A.2 Unions￿programme
In the following, given that the steady state model features a balanced growth path, all
variables are appropriately de￿ ated to be stationary in the stochastic equilibrium. The
￿rst order condition of the union￿ s program for the re-optimized wage w￿




￿w(1 +  w)



















































































The aggregate wage dynamics could also be expressed as
(wt)












1￿￿w(1+ w) ￿w￿;t￿1 (28)
The previous equations include a dispersion index ￿w￿;t which is related to the re-
optimizing wage and the aggregate wage through the following conditions
1 =
1





1 +  w
￿wl;t (29)

















The market clearing condition linking total labor demand of intermediate ￿rms and
total labor supply of households includes a wage dispersion index given by
￿wk;t =
1





1 +  w
(31)
with


















The ￿rst order condition of the intermediate ￿rms pro￿t maximization leads to
p￿
t =
￿p(1 +  )


































































Aggregate price dynamics can then be written as
￿p￿;t = (1 ￿ ￿p)(p￿
t)









The dispersion index ￿p￿;t is given by
1 =
1





1 +  
￿pl;t (38)



















1 +  
(40)
with
￿p;t = (1 ￿ ￿p)(p￿
t)









B Derivation of the optimal policy
The derivation of the optimal policy involves the di⁄erentiation of the constraints (20),
(21), (22), (25), (26), (27), (34), (35) and (36) with respect to Wt. In the Lagrangian,
all these constraints can be written in the form:
Et￿1 [XWtdt]43
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